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Communicating Vertical Hierarchies:  








I study the rationale for information sharing in a model where two principals, which exert production externalities 
one on another, endogenously decide whether to exchange information about their exclusive agents. I show that 
one novel effect shapes communication decisions when agents are privately informed about production costs. 
This effect is absent under complete information and it turns out to be of first-order magnitude relative to those 
emerging in such benchmark. Roughly, what matters is how sharing information impacts contracting relationships 
within opponent organizations, and therefore its effect on equilibrium outputs. Information exchange induces 
strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. Because of those distortions, the equilibrium value of 
communication depends on the interplay between the nature of upstream externalities and the sign of cost 
correlation. When upstream externalities and cost correlation have the same sign, there exists a unique 
symmetric equilibrium with no communication. By contrast, when upstream externalities and cost correlation have 
opposite signs there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where both principals share information. I also show 
that, unlike in previous models, under asymmetric information principals might run into a prisoner dilemma when 
there is no communication at equilibrium. Information sharing is also shown to have an unambiguous negative 
effect on rents. Moreover, there exists a system of transfers such that the equilibrium outcome obtained when 
both principals share information is collusion-proof. 
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Understanding the reasons why people share private information is a long-standing research topic
in economics. Information sharing (IS) agreements are widespread in real life. Banks and ﬁnancial
intermediaries usually exchange information about borrowers; sellers often share with competi-
tors their knowledge about demand and cost conditions; retailers commonly report information
regarding the downstream market to their suppliers; large corporations, as well as many other
complex organizations, regularly disclose their management performance to outside parties.
Stemming from Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), and Vives (1984), numer-
ous contributions have shown that IS agreements can either emerge for efﬁciency reasons, or to
dampen competition in oligopolistic markets.1 In the banking literature, lenders exchange infor-
mation about borrowers to better screen investment projects (adverse selection) or to avoid the
danger of opportunistic behavior by funded entrepreneurs (moral hazard) — see, e.g., Pagano
and Jappelli (1993) and subsequent models.2 The role of experts, which acquire and disclose in-
formation to trading counterparts, has been studied in the intermediation literature — see, e.g.,
Lizzeri (1999) and Gromb and Martimort (2007). The related work on consumers’ privacy consid-
ered, instead, environments where sellers can use information on individual purchasing history to
engage in product customization and price discrimination — see, e.g., Acquisti and Varian (2005),
Dodds (2002), and Taylor (2004). More recently, the role of strategic communication has also been
studied in the ‘networks’ literature, which analyzes the reasons why people in the same network
exchange private information — see, e.g., Calvó et al. (2009) and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010).
This literature offers a detailed picture of the reasons for the emergence of IS agreements. But,
all these papers model communicators as black-boxes and are thus silent on the interplay between
information exchange and agency conﬂicts within and, perhaps more importantly, across organi-
zations. One recent exception is Calzolari and Pavan (2006) who study the costs and beneﬁts of
information transmission in a sequential common agency set-up.3 The key difference between
the mechanism design approach taken in Calzolari and Pavan (2006) and the earlier IS literature
is that they consider situations where principals learn through costly contracting and then share
the elicited information with rivals — i.e., games in which players acquire private information via
the contracting interaction with common parties, and create new private information by taking
decisions that affect both rivals and contractual counterparts.
In these games, IS brings out novel effects that are intimately related to the way the infor-
mation disclosed by one player affects the contractual relationships between other players in the
game, and therefore equilibrium choices. Calzolari and Pavan (2006), however, mainly focus on
non-exclusive contracting, and are silent on the effects of communication when deals are exclu-
1See, e.g., Gal-Or (1986), Shapiro (1986), Raith (1996), Vives and Khun (2001), among others.
2See, e.g., Padilla and Pagano (1997)-(2000), Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Manove et al. (2001), Carlin and Rob (2009),
Bennardo et al. (2010) among many others.
3The same idea has been developed under moral hazard by Bennardo et al. (2010) and Maier and Ottaviani (2009).
2sive, which is the key feature of my model. Exclusivity clauses are common in many real markets,
and are therefore worth to analyze — see, e.g., Caillaud et al. (1995). Several employment relation-
ships are, by their own nature, exclusive (e.g., because of labor natural indivisibility); supply and
franchising contracts in the manufacturing industry are often exclusive (i.e., retailers distributing
a given brand are prevented from dealing with competing brands); procurement, regulatory and,
to some extent, also ﬁnancial contracting feature forms of exclusivity. Moreover, there exists sub-
stantial evidence showing that IS agreements are widespread in industries where exclusive deals
are rather frequent.4 For instance, the growth of information intensive channels is often seen as a
mean to facilitate the dissemination of information not only within a given organization, but also
among competing ones — see, e.g., Stern et al. (1996).5 What are the drivers of IS decisions in
these contexts? How does the exchange of information interplay with rent extraction on the one
hand, and with horizontal externalities across organizations on the other? What are the resulting
effects of this interaction?
These issues are addressed in a model where players interact strategically not only within the
same organization but also with members of different, and potentially competing organizations.
There are two independent principals that exert production externalities one on another. Each
principal delegates production to an exclusive agent, which is privately informed about his mar-
ginal cost of production (type). Principals do not observe costs and need to elicit such information
through the design of incentive compatible contracts. Moreover, they can (credibly) commit to
share the (private) reports made by their agents at the contracting stage. IS decisions are taken
simultaneously and non-cooperatively at the outset of the game. I allow both for positive and
negative cost correlation. But, to keep the analysis tractable, I assume that upstream externali-
ties are small and abstract from the possibility of information manipulation on the part of active
communicators.6
I show that one main effect shapes principals’ communication decisions when agents own
privileged information. This effect is absent under complete information, and it turns out to
be of ﬁrst-order magnitude relative to the effects that drive communication decisions in such
benchmark. Roughly, what matters is how sharing information impacts contracting relationships
within opponent organizations, and therefore its resulting effect on equilibrium outputs. When
there is adverse selection within and across organizations, IS induces strategies to be correlated,
but mainly via the distortions channel. And, because of those distortions, the equilibrium value
of communication depends only on the interplay between the nature of upstream externalities,
4According to Briley et al. (1994), for instance, this seems to be the established praxis in business format franchising
where the mandatory disclosure of franchising contracts required by the Federal Trade Commission since 1979 allows
ﬁrms to have free access to some of their rivals’ characteristics — e.g., costs.
5For instance, partners that invest in bundles of sophisticated information technology like telecommunication and
satellite linkages, bar coding and electronic scanning systems, database management systems etc.
6While the non-manipulability assumption is strong, it is usually imposed in the IS literature and is not implausible
for certain types of communication — e.g., communication which entails the exchange of information about certiﬁable
contractual agreements.
3which can be either positive or negative, and the sign of cost correlation.
When upstream externalities and cost correlation have the same sign — i.e., they are either
both positive or both negative — there exists a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies with
no communication. To see why, suppose that upstream externalities as well as cost correlation
are negative. By revealing her agent cost, a principal induces the rival to distort more (resp. less)
output in the state where the ﬁrst principal faces a high- (resp. low-) cost agent. This is because
costs are negatively correlated, and therefore higher distortions will be forced in those states that
are (conditionally) less likely. But, with negative externalities, this reduces the ﬁrst principal’s
(expected) proﬁt because reaction functions are downward sloped — i.e., each principal gains
from expanding (resp. reducing) own production when the rival is inefﬁcient (resp. efﬁcient).
Next, suppose that both upstream externalities and cost correlation are both positive. By revealing
her agent’s cost, a principal induces the rival to distort more (resp. less) output in the state where
the ﬁrst principal faces a low- (resp. high-) cost agent (because costs are positively correlated).
But, this is detrimental to the ﬁrst principal because, with positive externalities, reaction functions
are upward sloped — i.e., each principal beneﬁts from increasing production as a response to an
expansion of the rival’s output.
By contrast, when upstream externalities and cost correlation have opposite signs there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies where both principals share information.
To see why, suppose ﬁrst that upstream externalities are negative and that costs are positively
correlated. By disclosing her agent’s cost, a principal induces the rival to distort more (resp. less)
output in the state where the ﬁrst principal deals with a low- (resp. high-) cost agent (because
costs are positively correlated). And this increases the ﬁrst principal’s (expected) proﬁt because
reaction functions are downward sloped. Next, suppose that upstream externalities are positive
andcostsarenegativelycorrelated. Byrevealingheragent’scost, aprincipalinducesheropponent
to distort more (resp. less) output in the state where the ﬁrst principal deals with a high- (resp.
low-) cost agent (again because costs are negatively correlated). And, this is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrst
principal because reaction functions are upward sloped.
I also show that, unlike the complete information analysis, where the equilibrium outcome is
always efﬁcient, principals may run into a prisoners’ dilemma when eliciting truthful information
is costly. More precisely, when there is no communication at equilibrium, expected proﬁts are
higher when both principals share information. The intuition for this result is straightforward. As
long as types are correlated, communication creates an informational externality that reduces the
expected rents each principal needs to give up in order to elicit truthful revelation of types. This
is because, when agents’ contracts are contingent on the rivals’ types, cost correlation generates a
relative performance evaluations effect that relaxes the rent-extraction efﬁciency trade-off by allow-
ing principals to span distortions over a broader set of contingencies — see, e.g., Riordan and
Sappington (1988). When upstream externalities are small, this effect outperforms the strategic
effect due to correlation among distortions.
4The analysis is then extended to allow for agents’ implicit collusion. Indeed, a potential draw-
back of communication is that, when both principals exchange information, the expected utility of
each agent is affected by his opponent’s report because contractual offers depend on such contin-
gency. Therefore, in principle, it could be possible that the equilibrium allocation characterized in
the regime where both principals share information, and each agent tells the truth expecting the
rival to do the same, might lead to a collusive equilibrium of the message game where efﬁcient
agents always lie to reap higher rents at the expense of principals. However, it turns out that,
within my framework where production externalities only affect upstream proﬁts, there exists a
system of transfers such that the equilibrium obtained under IS regime is collusion-proof if there
are no side-payments across agents.
Although I have developed the formal arguments in an abstract principal/agent framework,
the scope of my conclusions is much broader and it seems relevant for many applications in eco-
nomics and ﬁnance. The results derived throughout the paper apply basically to any vertical hier-
archies model involving horizontal externalities among principals, be it procurement contracting,
manufacturers/retailers deals, executive compensations, patent licensing, insurance or credit re-
lationships, to name only a few.
The paper is organized as follows. The game is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
equilibrium outcome under complete information. Section 4 introduces asymmetric information
and characterizes the equilibrium outputs in all possible information sharing regimes — i.e., when
there is no communication, when both principals share information and when only one principal
reveals her private information. Section 5 presents the equilibrium characterization. Section 6
considers the possibility of (implicit) collusion on the agent’s side. Section 7 concludes. All proof
are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Players. The game involves two vertical hierarchies. There are two (female) principals, P1 and P2,
and two (male) exclusive agents, A1 and A2. Agent Ai (i = 1;2) produces output qi in Pi’s behalf.
All players are risk neutral. Principal Pi’s utility from production is
V i(qi;qj;ti) = Si(qi;qj) ￿ ti i = 1;2;
where qi (resp. qj) is the output produced by Ai (resp. Aj), and ti (resp. tj) is the monetary transfer
ﬂowing from Pi to Ai (resp. from Pj to Aj). Agent Ai’s utility is
Ui (ti;qi;￿i) = ti ￿ ￿iqi i = 1;2:
The parameter ￿i 2 ￿i ￿ ￿ (i = 1;2) measures hierarchy i’s marginal cost of production and is
5Ai’s private information. Hence, it can be learned by Pi only through a revelation mechanism,
hereafter denoted Ci, and by Pj and Aj only by way of an IS agreement.
Communication rules. At the outset of the game, principals independently and simultaneously decide
whether to exchange the information acquired at the contracting stage. If principal Pi decides to
disclose her private information about ￿i, principal Pj’s contractual offer Cj to agent Aj can be
conditioned on such contingency.
Announced disclosure policies cannot be renegotiated once principals learn their agents’ costs
— see, e.g., Vives (2001, Ch. 8) and Raith (1996) for a similar approach.7
Contracts. Contracts are secret: neither Pj nor Aj can observe Ci.8 I use the Revelation Principle
to characterize the equilibrium of the game — see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 2) and
Caillaud et al. (1995). Hence, Pi offers a direct revelation mechanism Ci to Ai, who then makes a
private report (message) mi 2 ￿ about his cost ￿i 2 ￿.
When principal Pj does not share her private information about ￿j, principal Pi offers a mech-
anism
Ci ￿ fti (mi);qi (mi)gmi2￿ ;
mapping Ai’s report mi into a monetary transfer ti (mi) and an output qi (mi).
When, instead, principal Pj discloses her private information about ￿j, contract Ci speciﬁes an
allocation contingent also on such information — i.e., on Aj’s report to Pj. Therefore,
Ci ￿ fti (mijmj);qi (mijmj)g(mi;mj)2￿2 :
The report made by Ai to Pi can be credibly shared with Pj, and then transmitted by Pj to Aj —
i.e., there is no moral hazard issue on the principals’ side (see Dequiedt and Martimort, 2010, for
an analysis in this spirit). In other words, exchanged information is veriﬁable.
Timing. A two stage game is considered in which principals ﬁrst choose simultaneously and in-
dependently their communication behavior; uncertainty realizes, contracts are offered and then
communication, if any, takes place. The timing of the game (thereafter G) is as follows:
￿ (T=0) Principals independently and simultaneously decide whether to share information.
￿ (T=1) Uncertainty realizes and agents privately observe their costs. All players learn the IS
decisions made at T=0.
￿ (T=2) Contracts are offered.
7Ziv (1993) shows that, without commitment, there is no communication at equilibrium.
8In a regulatory environment, Iossa and Stroffolini (2010) argue that, by making procurement contracts public,
regulators’ might signal information about demand or costs to potential competitors of regulated ﬁrms. Secret contracts
rule out this signaling issue in my framework.
6￿ (T=3) Communication, if any, takes place.
￿ (T=4) Agents produce and payments are made.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, with the added pas-
sive beliefs reﬁnement — i.e., when an agent is offered a contract different from the one he expects
in equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the contract offered to the other agent (see, e.g.,
Caillaud et al., 1995, and Martimort, 1996).
Assumptions. The analysis is developed under the following assumptions:




. The vector of random variables ￿ =(￿1;￿2)
is drawn from a joint cumulative distribution function with: Pr(￿;￿) = ￿2 + ￿, Pr(￿;￿) =
Pr(￿;￿) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ and Pr(￿;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿. The marginal distribution entails:
Pr(￿) = ￿ andPr(￿) = 1￿￿:PosteriorsarecomputedthroughtheBayesrule: Pr(￿j￿) = ￿+￿
￿,
Pr(￿j￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿￿, Pr(￿j￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ and Pr(￿j￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
1￿￿.
The parameter ￿ is equal to the correlation index between the two random variables ￿1 and
￿2— i.e., Pr(￿;￿)Pr(￿;￿) ￿ Pr(￿;￿)2 = ￿. Hence, ￿ > 0 (resp. <) means positive (resp. negative)
correlation between types.
A2 The surplus function Si (:) is symmetric — i.e., Si (x;y) = Sj (x;y) = S (x;y) for all (x;y) —
and quadratic, with
S (qi;qj) = ￿ + ￿qi ￿ q2
i + ￿qiqj i;j = 1;2: (1)
The quadratic set-up is the workhorse benchmark developed in the earlier IS literature — see,
e.g., Raith (1996) and Vives (2001, Ch. 8). Under A2, Si (:) is concave in qi so as to have single
peaked proﬁt functions. Moreover, ￿ > ￿ > ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ small to ensure positive outputs
and rule out shut-down solutions in all cases. Finally, ￿ measures the extent of (strategic) com-
plementarity (￿ > 0) or substitutability (￿ < 0) between outputs. To emphasize the contribution
of the paper in the clearest possible way, throughout I assume that ￿ is small. Hence, whenever
possible, expected proﬁts will be computed through Taylor approximations.
A3 Non-negative probabilities:





￿ 0 () minf(1 ￿ ￿);￿g ￿
p
j￿j if ￿ < 0.
To make the problem interesting for my purposes, I assume that agents must get a non-
negative utility in each contractible state — i.e., Ai’s utility must be non-negative in each state
mi if Pj does not disclose her private information about ￿j; and it must be non-negative in all
states m = (mi;mj) when Pj discloses her information about ￿j.
7A4 Limited liability on the agents’ side — i.e.,
U (ti;qi;￿i) = ti ￿ qi￿i ￿ 0 8 (ti;qi;￿i) 2 <2 ￿ ￿:
This hypothesis is standard in the screening literature, and plays an important role here: it
makes it impossible for Pi to leave Ai with no surplus when Pj shares her private information
about ￿j.9
Following Vives (1985) and Raith (1996), I will restrict attention to communication equilibria
where principals follow the all-or-none sharing rule — i.e., disclosure policies are deterministic.
A5 Principals either fully commit to disclose their agents’ costs, or they keep this information
secret.
3 The complete information benchmark
Before studying asymmetric information, it is important to brieﬂy describe the equilibria of game
G under complete information. When costs are common knowledge within each hierarchy, agents
are left with no rents irrespective of principals’ communication decisions. Hence, it is as if the two
hierarchies were vertically integrated. The structure of game G is then similar to Shapiro (1986),
who analyzes a model where ﬁrms that compete à la Cournot exchange cost information.
In order to understand the key economic forces driving the (equilibrium) communication de-
cisions under complete information, it is useful to state two properties of expected outputs and
proﬁts. Let si be the contingency upon which principal Pi is able to condition the contract offered
to agent Ai given Pj’s communication choice. Under A5, si = ￿i if Pj does not disclose her cost ￿j
and si = (￿1;￿2) if Pj commits to disclose it. Moreover, denote by q￿
i (si) the output chosen by Pi
in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Irrespective of Pj’s communication choice, Pi’s expected proﬁt is
V ￿












Expected output is the same irrespective of principals’ communication decisions — i.e.,
q￿ ￿ E￿i(q￿








9The full-surplus extraction result has been shown by Riordan and Sappington (1988) in a isolated principal-agent
framework. In the auction literature, this result was developed by Cremer and McLean (1985). The same approach was
then extended to a vertical hierarchies framework under no limited liability by Bertoletti and Poletti (1996).
8In equilibrium, principals beneﬁt from a larger scale of production and, because indirect proﬁt
functions are convex, they also enjoy more volatile outputs. Moreover, under A2 (state contingent)
outputs are linear in costs. Therefore, IS decisions do not affect expected output — see, e.g., Vives
(2001, Ch. 8) among many others.
In sum, Lemma 1 implies that, when choosing her communication strategy, each principal
simply picks the one that maximizes own equilibrium output volatility (given the opponent’s
communication behavior). The argument is as follows. By allowing Pj to learn ￿i, Pi can inﬂuence
the distribution of Pj’s equilibrium output, and therefore also her own output volatility. This
is because, under assumption A2, reaction functions are linear. Hence, ceteris paribus, if q￿
j (sj)
becomes more volatile, also the variance of q￿
i (si) increases.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ￿ is small. Under complete information game G has following equilibrium
features:
￿ For ￿ = 0 or Pr(￿;￿) = 0, there are two symmetric, pay-off equivalent equilibria: one where both
principals share information, and the other where they do not communicate.
￿ For ￿ 6= 0, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies where both principals
share information if ￿ > 0 or if j￿j < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) when ￿ < 0. Otherwise, there exists a unique
equilibrium in dominant strategies with no communication.
To explain why, under complete information, principals communicate only when costs are
positively or not too negatively correlated, suppose that Pj commits to disclose ￿j, and consider
Pi’s incentive to reveal ￿i. Sharing information has both direct and indirect effects on the equilib-
rium distribution of outputs. First, ceteris paribus, by allowing Pj to condition contract Cj on ￿i
expands the set of contingencies upon which Aj’s output can be conditioned. Hence, the volatility
of output increases, everything else being kept equal: a direct effect of communication. Second, de-
pending on the degree of cost correlation, revealing ￿i also affects the degree of correlation among
equilibrium outputs: an indirect effect. If costs are positively correlated, when both principals
share information there is a higher probability of being at the extreme values of the distribution
of outputs — i.e., either in state (￿;￿) or (￿;￿). In those symmetric states, both ﬁrms produce the
same output, which is either very large (when both are efﬁcient) or very small (when they are both
inefﬁcient). Hence, in this case, communication also spurs volatility indirectly. If, instead, costs
are negatively correlated, the most likely states are the intermediate ones — i.e., (￿;￿) and (￿;￿). In
these asymmetric states Aj’s equilibrium output when both principals share information is more
concentrated around its mean. Therefore, in this case, communication has an indirect negative
impact on volatility.
In sum, with positive or not too negative cost correlation, there exists an equilibrium with com-
munication because the direct effect of IS outperforms the indirect one; which, instead, prevails
when correlation is negative and large in absolute value. Of course, when there are no upstream
9externalities, Pi’s pay-off is unaffected by Pj’s output. Learning ￿j has, therefore, no value. The
same is true in the limiting case where costs are perfectly correlated — i.e., Pr(￿;￿) = 0 — where
the output volatility is the same irrespective of principals’ communication decisions.
Armed with the equilibrium characterization of game G, one may wonder whether these out-
comes are efﬁcient — i.e., if the maximize principals’ expected proﬁt. The next corollary makes
this point.
Corollary 1 Suppose that ￿ is small. Under complete information, the equilibrium of game G is always
efﬁcient — i.e., expected proﬁts are higher when both principals share information than when they do not
communicate if ￿ > 0 or if j￿j < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) when ￿ < 0. The converse obtains otherwise.
Under complete information, the equilibrium of game G is always efﬁcient: a prediction that
is in line with the general analysis of IS in oligopoly provided by Raith (1996). The interpretation
of this result rests again on the tension between the direct and indirect effects of communication
just discussed above. However, it is worth noting that, whereas earlier IS models mainly allow for
independent or positively correlated types, negative correlation here may change the result. For
instance, while Shapiro (1986) argues that, with substitutes, IS unambiguously increases proﬁts,
Corollary 1 shows that this is not necessarily true if ￿ is negative and large in absolute value.
4 Asymmetric information
Consider now asymmetric information. Before sharing information, principals must learn their
own agents’ costs through costly contracting — i.e., they must give up an information rent in or-
der to screen types. And, the minimization of these rents leads to equilibrium outcomes that are
distorted away from efﬁciency. These distortions will, of course, depend on the information dis-
closureregime, whichwillinturnaffectthestrategicinteractionbetweenprincipalsand, therefore,
the value of communication.
Since IS decisions are public, I will solve game G with a standard backward induction argu-
ment. Hence, the ﬁrst step will be to characterize equilibrium contracts within each of the follow-
ing subgames: the case of no communication — i.e., the subgame where principals do not share
information; the case of bilateral information sharing — i.e., the subgame where both principals
disclose their private information; and, ﬁnally, the case of unilateral information sharing — i.e.,
the subgame where only one principal reveals her private information.
104.1 No communication
Suppose that principals do not exchange information. For a separating equilibrium to exist, prin-
cipal Pi must offer a contract Ci that satisﬁes the following incentive and participation constraints
Ui (￿i) = ti (￿i) ￿ ￿iqi (￿i) ￿ 0 8 ￿i 2 ￿;
Ui (￿i) ￿ ti (mi) ￿ ￿iqi (mi) 8 (￿i;mi) 2 ￿2:
As standard in the screening literature, only the incentive constraint of the efﬁcient type and the
participation constraint of the inefﬁcient type matter — see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002, Ch.
2). Hence,
Ui(￿) ￿ Ui(￿) + ￿￿qi(￿); (2)
Ui(￿) ￿ 0: (3)
Let qe (￿j) be agent Aj’s output in a (symmetric) separating equilibrium. Principal Pi solves the
following mechanism design problem
max
fqi(￿i);Ui(￿i)g￿i2￿
E￿jE￿i(S (qi(￿i);qe (￿j)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿i)j￿i) ￿ E￿i(Ui (￿i)); subject to (2)-(3).




E￿jE￿i(S (qi(￿i);qe (￿j)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿i)j￿i) ￿ ￿￿￿qi(￿): (4)
Because agents’ costs are correlated, when maximizing her expected proﬁt, Pi’s posterior on ￿j
depends on Ai’s report. Unlike the complete information case, however, Pi must now grant a
costly rent ￿￿qi(￿) to Ai in order to elicit a truthful report.
Optimizing, the necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order conditions are10
E￿ (S1 (qe(￿);qe (￿))j￿) = ￿; (5)




Low-cost types’ output is chosen so as to equalize (expected) marginal revenues to marginal costs:
the efﬁcient rule in the Bayesian sense. High-cost types are, instead, forced to produce a down-
ward distorted output for rent extraction reasons.
Proposition 2 Suppose that principals do not communicate. The unique symmetric separating PBE of this
10With a slight abuse of notation I will denote by S1 (:) the partial derivative of S (qi;qj) with respect to qi.
11subgame features outputs linear in ￿ and ￿￿, with
qe (￿) = q￿ (￿) ￿
￿￿(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿)





(2 ￿ ￿)(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿:
Moreover, the following properties hold:
￿ qe(￿) ￿ q￿(￿) (resp. <) if ￿ ￿ 0 (resp. >).
￿ qe(￿) < q￿(￿).
￿ ￿qe = qe(￿) ￿ qe(￿) > 0 for ￿￿ 6= 0 and ￿ 6= 0, with
￿qe =
￿￿￿
2￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿
:





Albeit being set with an efﬁcient rule, the equilibrium output in the low-cost state still fea-
tures some distortion. This is because when principals do not share information, they must form
expectations about the opponent’s output, which in a separating equilibrium is distorted at bot-
tom.11 When ￿ = 0 the output in the low-cost state is the efﬁcient one — i.e., the ﬁrst-best level
that would emerge in a single hierarchy model. When ￿ 6= 0, instead, the distortion of Aj’s output
affects Ai’s output in the low cost state through the upstream externalities: if goods are substitutes
(resp. complements) a lower Aj’s output in the high-cost state calls for a higher (resp. lower) Ai’s
output in the low-cost state. Finally, expected output is lower under asymmetric information than
under complete information because, with privately informed agents, rent extraction requires a
downward distortion in the high cost state.




The effect of increased correlation on the (equilibrium) output spread ￿qe depends solely on
the sign of ￿. The argument is as follows. A higher ￿ implies that when one agent’s cost is high,
his opponent’s cost is more likely to be high as well. Hence, for ￿ < 0, it is less proﬁtable for a
principal to distort the output of a high cost type — whereby increasing the difference ￿qe. This
is because, with strategic substitutes, each principal gains from expanding output when her rival
is expected to under-produce. Differently, for ￿ > 0, a higher ￿ leads to an increase in ￿qe because
11See also Cella and Etro (2010) on this two-way distortion result.
12of strategic complementarities: principals beneﬁt from coordinating distortions in such a way to
jointly increase production when they both deal with low cost agents and cut it back when they
both deal with an inefﬁcient type.
4.2 Bilateral information sharing
Suppose now that both principals exchange information. Consider a pure strategy, symmetric
separating equilibrium where agent Ai truthfully reports his type to principal Pi — i.e., mi = ￿i
for all i = 1;2 — who then discloses this information to the pair Pj ￿ Aj. Since contract Ci
speciﬁes an allocation contingent on the aggregate state ￿ =(￿1;￿2) and agents are protected by
limited liability, in addition to the ex ante participation constraints,
E￿j (Ui (￿ij￿j)j￿i) ￿ 0 8 ￿i 2 ￿; (7)
the following limited liability constraints must hold for Ci to be accepted
Ui (￿ij￿j) = ti (￿ij￿j) ￿ ￿iqi (￿ij￿j) ￿ 0 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2.
Clearly, when this inequality is satisﬁed in all states, (7) becomes redundant.
As for the truth-telling condition, recall that reports are made before information is eventually
exchanged. Hence, Ai doesnotknowAj’scostwhenmakinghisreport. Thisleadstothefollowing
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint
E￿j (Ui (￿ij￿j)j￿i) ￿ E￿j (ti (mij￿j) ￿ ￿iqi (mij￿j)j￿i) 8 (mi;￿i) 2 ￿2. (8)
Principal Pi’s mechanism design problem can be then solved in the standard way. First, it is easy
to show that the relevant limited liability constraints are those of the high-cost type — i.e.,
Ui(￿j￿j) ￿ 0 8 ￿j 2 ￿, (9)
while the relevant incentive constraint is that of the low-cost type
E￿j(Ui(￿j￿j)j￿) ￿ E￿j(ti(￿j￿j) ￿ ￿qi(￿j￿j)j￿i):
Using a standard change of variables, this inequality rewrites as
E￿j(Ui(￿j￿j)j￿) ￿ E￿j(Ui(￿j￿j)j￿) + ￿￿E￿j(qi(￿j￿j)j￿): (10)
13Let qe (￿ij￿j) denote the equilibrium output. Principal Pi then solves
max
fqi(￿ij￿j);Ui(￿ij￿j)g(￿i;￿j)2￿2
E￿jE￿i (S (qi (￿ij￿j);qe (￿jj￿i)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿ij￿j) ￿ Ui (￿ij￿j)j￿i);
subject to (9)-(10).
At the optimum, the transfer ti(￿j￿j) is such that the high-cost type gets no rent irrespective of
his opponent’s cost — i.e., ti(￿j￿j) = ￿qi(￿j￿j) for all ￿j: Moreover, it is also easy to verify that the
incentive constraint (10) is binding — i.e.,
E￿j(Ui(￿j￿j)j￿) = ￿￿E￿j(qi(￿j￿j)j￿): (11)
Substituting this constraint into Pi’s objective function, the (relaxed) optimization is
max
fqi(￿ij￿j)g(￿i;￿j)2￿2
E￿jE￿i (S (qi (￿ij￿j);qe (￿jj￿i)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿ij￿j)j￿i) ￿ ￿￿￿E￿j(qi(￿j￿j)j￿): (12)
Even if under IS principals can condition contracts on the opponent’s costs, full surplus extraction
is impossible. This is because agents must get a non-negative utility in every contractible state, so
they are still able to command some information rents from their private information.
The symmetric equilibrium output is determined by the following necessary and sufﬁcient
ﬁrst-order conditions
S1 (qe(￿j￿);qe(￿j￿)) = ￿ 8 ￿ 2 ￿; (13)





￿￿ 8 ￿ 2 ￿: (14)
Again, there is no distortion at the top and downward distortion at the bottom — i.e., low-cost
types produce according to an efﬁcient rule, while high-cost types’ output is distorted for rent
extraction reasons. However, equation (14) implies that, under IS, the distortion increases with
Pr(￿j￿)
Pr(￿j￿). This ratio is an index of informativeness that signal ￿ provides on the state ￿ relative to
signal ￿. Essentially, principals require a higher distortion in the rival’s cost state that is (condi-
tionally) less likely. For instance, if state ￿i = ￿ signals to Pi a higher probability of state ￿j = ￿
relative to ￿j = ￿, then Pi prefers to distort more qi(￿j￿) than qi(￿j￿), everything else being equal.








￿ 0 (resp. < 0) () ￿ ￿ 0 (resp. < 0).
Hence, the distortion of a high-cost agent’s output is larger (resp. lower) when his opponent has
a high (resp. low) cost too if types are negatively (resp. positively) correlated. This is because,
with positive correlation (￿ > 0) a principal dealing with a high-cost type anticipates that the
14opponent’s agent is likely to have a high cost too, and therefore requires a higher distortion in the
less likely state where the opponent has a low cost — i.e., ￿(￿;￿) > 0. For ￿ < 0, the same type
of argument explains why the distortion is higher when the opponent is inefﬁcient.
Let q￿ (￿ij￿j) be agent Ai’s equilibrium output with bilateral information sharing under com-
plete information (See Appendix).
Proposition 3 Suppose that both principals share information. The unique symmetric PBE of this sub-
game entails outputs linear in ￿ and ￿￿, with
qe(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) qe(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
￿(￿2 + ￿)
(4 ￿ ￿2)(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
￿￿;





(4 ￿ ￿2)(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
￿￿ qe(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(2 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿)
￿￿:
Moreover, the following properties hold:
￿ qe(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿).
￿ qe(￿j￿) < q￿(￿j￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿:
￿ qe(￿j￿) ￿ q￿(￿j￿) (resp. <) if and only if ￿ ￿ 0 (resp. >).






Under IS there is a strategic linkage between the distortion required by one principal and
the opponent’s (equilibrium) output proﬁle — i.e., the output that Pi requires from Ai depends
on Aj’s cost, and therefore it is correlated with the distortion that Pj is expected to impose on
Aj’s equilibrium output. This explains why the sign of ￿ induces over- or under-production for
Ai relative to the complete information benchmark when ￿j = ￿. Finally, the fact that expected
outputsarethesamewhenthereisnocommunicationandwhenbothprincipalsshareinformation
is again due to linearity of outputs with respect to costs. Again, the fact that expected output is
the same with and without communication is due to the quadratic speciﬁcation in A2.
4.3 Unilateral information sharing
Suppose now that only one principal, say Pi with no loss of generality, commits to disclose her pri-
vate information. Accordingly, let qe
i(￿i) and qe
j(￿jj￿i) be the corresponding equilibrium outputs.





j(￿jj￿i)j￿i) ￿ E￿i(￿iqi (￿i)) ￿ ￿￿￿qi(￿);




i (￿i)) ￿ ￿jqj (￿jj￿i)j￿j) ￿ ￿￿￿E￿i(qj(￿j￿i)j￿):
Given her IS decision, Pi has to take into account the fact that Pj will be able to condition Aj’s
output on Ai’s report. Differently, Pj must take into account the fact that her choice of not sharing
information will force Pi to condition the menu Ci only on Ai’s report.
Optimizing, the necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order conditions of Pi’s program are
E￿j(S1(qe
i(￿);qe
j (￿jj￿))j￿) = ￿; (15)
E￿j(S1(qe
i(￿);qe




The necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order conditions of Pj’s program are
S1(qe
j(￿j￿i);qe
i (￿i)) = ￿ 8 ￿i 2 ￿;
S1(qe
j(￿j￿i);qe





￿￿ 8 ￿i 2 ￿:
Low-cost types produce according to an efﬁcient rule, while high-cost types have their output
distorted for rent-extraction reasons. Moreover, because Pj does not share information, Pi can
condition her contractual offer only on Ai’s report, while Pj is able to implement a ﬂexible pro-
duction plan by conditioning Aj ’s output on ￿i. This asymmetry conveys to Pj a competitive
advantage relative to Pi insofar as it allows to require a higher distortion in the states of nature
that are (conditionally) less likely.
Proposition 4 Suppose that only principal Pi shares information. The unique symmetric PBE of this
subgame entails outputs linear in ￿ and ￿￿, with,
qe
j(￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
￿


























2(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2)
￿￿:












￿ Expected output is the same for both hierarchies and it is equal to the expected output obtained when
there is no communication and when both principals share information — i.e.,
E￿j(qe





The economic interpretation of this result rests on the same arguments developed above.
Hence, it will be omitted.
5 Communication at equilibrium?
Building on the characterization developed above, I now turn to study the equilibrium commu-
nication outcome. Principals’ proﬁts when they choose to share information (I) or not to share it























I and V e
N are the (expected) proﬁts that principals make when they both share informa-
tion and when they do not communicate, respectively. Moreover, V e
I;N is the (expected) proﬁt that
a principal obtains when she commits to reveal her agent’s cost when the opponent principal does
not disclose her agent’s cost. Similarly, V e
N;I is the (expected) proﬁt that a principal obtains when
she does not share information given that her opponent has committed to reveal her agent’s cost.
An equilibrium where both principals share information exists if and only if the following
condition holds
V e
I ￿ V e
N;I: (17)
By contrast, an equilibrium with no communication exists if and only if the following condition
holds
V e
N ￿ V e
I;N:
17Note that the incentive to share information hinges on the effect that principals’ communi-
cation decisions have on the rivals’ behavior. This is because, each principal chooses her best
communication behavior given the IS decision of the opponent. Therefore, there is one key effect
that shapes the equilibrium communication decisions under asymmetric information. The argu-
ment is as follows. Since under IS principals tailor outputs to the opponent’s type, distortions are
correlated at equilibrium, and this might by proﬁtable to the extent that it ‘softens’ upstream com-
petition. Essentially, while outputs are independently distributed with no communication, under
IS principals may whish to synchronize or disharmonize distortions for strategic reasons: a correlated
distortions effect.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ￿ is small enough. Under asymmetric information game G has the following
equilibrium features:
￿ For ￿ = 0, there are two symmetric, pay-off equivalent equilibria: one with IS and one without IS.
￿ For ￿ 6= 0 and ￿￿ ￿ 0, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies where
both principals share information.
￿ For ￿￿ > 0, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies without communication.
The incentive of a principal to disclose her agent’s cost depends only on the way this infor-
mation affects the rival’s equilibrium output via the correlated distortions channel. If goods are
substitutes (resp. complements), and sharing information induces rivals to expand (resp. cut
back) output in the most likely states, then principals have no incentive to unilaterally disclose
their agents’ costs. Similarly, if goods are substitutes (resp. complements), and sharing informa-
tion induces rivals to cut back (resp. expand) output in the most likely states, then communication
will be worthwhile.
Clearly, when ￿ = 0 communication plays no role because there is no strategic interaction
between principals: disclosing information does not affect rivals’ behavior. When ￿ is different
than zero (but small), instead, the correlated distortions effect kicks in and its impact on the value
of communication depends only on the sign of ￿￿. To understand why, suppose that Pj commits
to disclose ￿j, and consider Pi’s incentive to reveal ￿i. The argument is as follows. Consider ﬁrst
￿￿ < 0 and suppose that ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0 — i.e., outputs are strategic substitutes and costs are
positively correlated. By disclosing ￿i, Pi enables Pj to condition Cj on such contingency. Hence,
when Aj’s cost is high, Pj will distort more (resp. less) output in the state where Ai’s cost is low
(resp. high) because costs are positively correlated. But this increases Pi’s proﬁts because goods
are strategic substitutes — i.e., reaction functions are negatively sloped — and each principal gains
from reducing (resp. expanding) her production as a response to an expansion (resp. reduction)
of the rival’s (expected) output. Next, suppose that ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0 — i.e., outputs are strategic
complements and costs are negatively correlated. By revealing ￿i, Pi induces Pj to distort more
18(resp. less) Aj’s output in the state where ￿i is high (resp. low) because costs are negatively
correlate. And this is beneﬁcial to Pi because, with strategic complements, principals gain from
choosing outputs that are positively correlated — i.e., reaction functions are positively sloped.
Consider now ￿￿ > 0. In this case, the correlated distortions effect makes communication
unproﬁtable. The argument is as follows. Suppose ﬁrst that that ￿ < 0 and ￿ < 0 — i.e., outputs
are strategic substitutes and costs are negatively correlated. By revealing ￿i, Pi induces Pj to
distort more (resp. less) Aj’s output in the state where ￿i is high (resp. low) because costs are
negatively correlated. But this reduces upstream proﬁts because goods are substitutes and each
principal gains from expanding (resp. reducing) own production when the rival is inefﬁcient
(resp. efﬁcient). Next, suppose that ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 — i.e., outputs are strategic complements
and costs are positively correlated. By revealing ￿i, Pi induces Pj to distort more (resp. less) Aj’s
output in the state where ￿i is low (resp. high) because costs are positively correlated. But, this
reduces Pi’s expected proﬁts because, with strategic complementarities, principals would like to
increase production as a response to an expansion of the rival’s output.
Note also that the correlated distortion effect is of ﬁrst-order magnitude relative to the effects
shaping communication decisions in the complete information analysis, where only the sign and
magnitude of ￿ matters in determining the value of communication at equilibrium.12
In the next proposition I compare the equilibrium proﬁts when both principals share informa-
tion and where they both do not share it.
Proposition 6 Suppose that ￿ is small. Principals’ expected proﬁts are larger when they both share infor-
mation than with no communication.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. As long as types are correlated, communication
creates an informational externality that, ceteris paribus, reduces the expected rents each principal
needs to give up to elicit truthful revelation of types. This is because, when agents’ contracts are
contingent on the rivals’ types, cost correlation generates a relative performance evaluations effect
that relaxes the rent-extraction efﬁciency trade-off — see Riordan and Sappington (1988). For ￿
small this effect outperforms the strategic effect due to correlated distortions because, in this case,
upstream externalities are negligible relative to the need for rent extraction, whereby making a
bilateral IS sharing agreement jointly proﬁtable for principals.
Hence, while under complete information the outcome of the non-cooperative game is always
efﬁcient from the principals’ perspective, with asymmetric information a Prisoners’ Dilemma may
emerge.
Lemma 3 Suppose that ￿ 6= 0 but small and that ￿￿ > 0. Then, game G entails no communication at
equilibrium, but this is inefﬁcient for the principals.
12In the proof of Proposition 1 it is shown that under complete information, for ￿ small, only terms of second-order
magnitude matter in signing the difference between expected proﬁts with and without information sharing.
19In sum, unlike in the complete information analysis, private and collective incentives to share
information may diverge in a vertical hierarchies model with privately informed agents.
Finally, because of the relative performance evaluations effect, communication has an unambigu-
ous impact on expected rents.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ￿ is small. Agents’ expected rents are larger under no communication than
under IS.
6 Agents’ (implicit) collusion
So far, I have characterized separating equilibria featuring Nash behavior by agents at the reve-
lation stage — i.e., incentive constraints have been constructed in such a way that, when making
his report, Ai believes that Aj is telling the truth. However, under IS the expected utility of each
agent is affected by his opponent’s report because principals offer contractual rules that depend
on such contingency. Therefore, in principle, the allocation characterized in this regime might not
be robust to implicit collusion by the agents. I rule out side payments for obvious reasons. In fact,
were I considering collusion among agents enforced through side transfers — see, e.g., Laffont
and Martimort (1997)-(2000) — there would be no a priori reasons for ruling out side transfers
also between principals. But, in this case, the analysis would be equivalent to Laffont and Marti-
mort (2000) where a single principal — i.e., the coalition formed by P1 and P2. — deals with two
colluding agents with correlated types — i.e., A1 and A2.
Hence, the issue is that there could exist an equilibrium of the continuation game where efﬁ-
cient agents (jointly) lie after receiving an offer Ce. In the absence of side transfers, this type of











That is, an efﬁcient agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to lie instead of telling the truth given that his efﬁcient
rival lies as well. Inequality (18) clearly depends on how equilibrium transfers are constructed
under IS. Hence, to investigate whether the equilibrium outcome characterized in Proposition 3
is undermined by the threat of collusion, one needs ﬁrst to identify the equilibrium transfers and
then check (18). However, under IS transfers are indeterminate in some states. This is because
agents are asked to make their reports before the information about rivals is transmitted. Hence,
the number of constraints that bind in a truthful equilibrium is smaller than the number of instru-
ments available to each principal.
To pin down transfers, note that the limited liability constraints of the inefﬁcient types imply
te(￿j￿) = ￿qe(￿j￿) for all ￿. Hence, (18) rewrites as:







20This implies that collusion is not viable if principals — actually even only one of them — imple-
ment a transfer te ￿
￿j￿
￿
such that: (i) agents still tell the truth when rivals are expected to do so;
(ii) limited liability constraints are satisﬁed in all states, and (iii) inequality (19) is not met. It
turns out that this is possible in the framework at hand.
Proposition 8 The equilibrium allocation characterized in Proposition 3 is robust to the threat of implicit
collusion by the agents — i.e., (18) cannot hold as long as:
te (￿j￿) = ￿qe(￿j￿);
and




Implicit collusion is therefore not an issue in the vertical hierarchies model at hand. Of course,
this is partly due to the fact that agents do not impose production externalities one on another —
see, e.g., Martimort (1996) for a model with this feature. In such setting communication would
not only create informational externalities among agents but also generate direct production ex-
ternalities that may make implicit collusion self-enforceable, an issue that I plan to tackle in future
research.
7 Concluding remarks
Already in 1974 Arrow argued that the essence of an organization is based on the trade-off be-
tween the costs and beneﬁts of communication among its members. This idea has been explored
in many settings. But, so far, no paper has considered the exchange of private information among
complex organizations. The objective of my analysis has been precisely to set up a model where
two independent principals, which exert production externalities one on another, and contract
with exclusive privately informed agents, endogenously decide whether to exchange informa-
tion. The analysis has identiﬁed one novel effect of IS. This effect emerges only when agents are
privately informed, and it turns out to be of ﬁrst-order magnitude relative to the effects that drive
communication decisions in the complete information benchmark. The key driver of IS decisions
under asymmetric information is intimately linked with the distortions generated by the need for
eliciting truthful information revelation. Essentially, IS induces distortions to be correlated. And,
because of those correlation, the equilibrium value of communication depends only on the inter-
play between the nature of upstream externalities and the sign of cost correlation. The analysis
has shown that there exists a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies with no communication
when upstream externalities and cost correlation have the same sign. By contrast, there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies where both principals share information
emerges when upstream externalities and cost correlation have opposite signs. I have also show
21that, unlike the complete information analysis, where the equilibrium outcome is always efﬁcient,
principals may run into a prisoners’ dilemma when agents own privileged information about their
costs. Finally, I argued that the characterization under IS is robust to implicit collusion by the
agents.
228 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to show the result I must ﬁrst characterize equilibrium outputs within
the three communication regimes where: (i) both principals share information; (ii) they do not
communicate; (iii) only one principal shares information.
No information sharing. Under complete information principals fully extract their agents’ rents. The
(symmetric) equilibrium market outcome, q￿ (￿i), is such that
q￿ (￿i) = argmax
qi(￿i)
E￿j (S (qi(￿i);q￿ (￿j)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿i)j￿i) 8 ￿i 2 ￿;
with the equilibrium transfer being set at the reservation level — i.e.,
Ui(￿i) = 0 8 ￿i 2 ￿ =) t￿ (￿i) = ￿iq￿ (￿i) 8 ￿i 2 ￿.
A symmetric equilibrium then satisﬁes the following necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order condi-
tions
E￿j (S1 (q￿(￿i);q￿ (￿j))j￿i) = ￿i 8 ￿i 2 ￿. (20)






￿ (￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿ q￿(￿) = q￿ (￿) ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿
￿￿: (21)
Bilateral information sharing. Consider now the regime where both principals share information.
Again, because costs are common knowledge, agents are left with no rents. The transfer is set at
the reservation level — i.e.,
Ui (￿ij￿j) = 0 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2 =) ti (￿ij￿j) = ￿iqi (￿ij￿j) 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2:
The equilibrium market outcome, q￿ (￿ij￿j), is such that
q￿ (￿jj￿i) = argmax
qi(￿ij￿j)
S (qi (￿ij￿j);q￿ (￿jj￿i)) ￿ ￿iqi (￿ij￿j) 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2:
The ﬁrst-order necessary and sufﬁcient conditions are
S1 (q￿ (￿ij￿j);q￿ (￿jj￿i)) = ￿i 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2: (22)




q￿(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
￿
4 ￿ ￿2￿￿;
q￿(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
2




23Unilateral information sharing. Finally, consider the case where one principal, say Pi, commits to





j(￿jj￿i)j￿i) ￿ E￿i(￿iqi (￿i));




i (￿i)) ￿ ￿jqj (￿jj￿i)j￿j):




j (￿jj￿i))j￿i) = ￿i 8 ￿i 2 ￿; (23)
S1(q￿
j(￿jj￿i);q￿
i (￿i)) = ￿j 8 (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿2; (24)






￿ (￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
4 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿￿ q￿
i (￿) = q￿
i (￿) ￿
2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿





j(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿
(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)￿2
2￿
￿
4 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿￿ q￿
j(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) ￿










4 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿ q￿
j(￿j￿) = q￿(￿j￿) +
(￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)￿2
2(1 ￿ ￿)(4 ￿ ￿2)
￿￿:
Characterization of expected proﬁts. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions (20), (22), (23) and (24) it is easy
to show that expected proﬁts are
V ￿
i = ￿ + Esi(q￿
i (si)j￿i))2;
then from E(~ x2) = [E(~ x)]2+E(~ x￿E(~ x))2 it follows that
V ￿
i = ￿ + [Esi(q￿
i (si)j￿i)]2 + Esi(q￿
i (si) ￿ Esi(q￿
i (si)j￿i)j￿i)2:
Consider now expected outputs. Let




taking expectations it easily follows that
E￿ (q￿ (￿)) = E￿jE￿i (q￿ (￿ij￿j)j￿i) = E￿(q￿
j (￿)) = E￿jE￿i (q￿
i (￿ij￿j)j￿i) = q￿;
24which proves the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Let V ￿
I and V ￿
N denote expected proﬁts when both principals share infor-
mation and when they do not communicate, respectively. Moreover, denote by V ￿
N;I principal Pi’s
proﬁt and by V ￿
I;N principal Pj’s proﬁt in the regime where Pi does not share information while
Pj shares information.
Suppose that ￿ is small but different than 0. A symmetric equilibrium where both principals
share information exists if and only if
V ￿
I ￿ V ￿
N;I:
Using a second-order Taylor approximation around the point ￿ = 0 one has
V ￿

















































































































































I ￿ V ￿
N;I ￿
(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)Pr(￿;￿)￿2￿￿2
8￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
: (25)
From equation (25) it is straightforward to show that, for ￿ small but different than 0, there exists
a symmetric equilibrium where both principals share information as long as ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ 0 —
i.e., if ￿ ￿ 0 or if j￿j ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) when ￿ < 0.
25Consider now a symmetric equilibrium with no communication. This equilibrium exists if and
only if
V ￿
N ￿ V ￿
I;N:
Using a second-order Taylor approximation around ￿ = 0 one has
V ￿































N ￿ ￿ + lim
￿!0
E￿i(q￿ (￿i)



















































N ￿ V ￿































N ￿ V ￿
I;N ￿ ￿
(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)Pr(￿;￿)￿2￿￿2
8￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
: (27)
From equation (27) it is straightforward to show that,for ￿ small, an equilibrium with no commu-
nication exists if and only if ￿ is negative large in absolute value — i.e., j￿j > ￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
Note also that because the sign of (25) is always opposite to the sign of (27), the equilibria of
game G are in dominant strategies for ￿ 6= 0. Finally, it is easy to show that for ￿ = 0 information
sharing has no impact on principals’ proﬁts — i.e., V ￿
N ￿V ￿
I;N = V ￿
I ￿V ￿
N;I = V ￿
I ￿V ￿
N = 0: Hence,
for ￿ = 0, game G features multiple pay-off equivalent equilibria with and without IS. ￿
26Proof of Corollary 1. First, using Lemma 1 it is easy to show that V ￿
I = V ￿
N for ￿ = 0 and that
V ￿
I ￿ V ￿
N =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(12 ￿ ￿2)￿2￿￿2
4(2 + ￿)2(2 ￿ ￿)2 > 0
for ￿ = 0. Suppose now that ￿ is different than 0 but small. Using the Taylor approximations for
V ￿
I and V ￿
N derived in the proof of Proposition 1 it follows that
V ￿
I ￿ V ￿




































I ￿ V ￿
N ￿
3Pr(￿;￿)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)￿2￿￿2
16￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
;
which immediately yields the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. To compute the equilibrium outputs under no IS, one simply solves the
system of ﬁrst-order conditions (5)-(6) for the quadratic speciﬁcation in A1. The difference ￿qe
follows immediately. ￿






(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿)
2;
which proves the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. To compute the equilibrium outputs with bilateral information sharing,
one simply solves the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (13)-(14) for the quadratic speciﬁcation in
A1. It then follows that






























Hence, E￿jE￿i (qe (￿ij￿j)j￿i) =E￿i (qe (￿i)). Moreover,










27The rest of the proof is straightforward. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. To compute the equilibrium outputs with unilateral information sharing,
one simply solves the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (15)-(16) for the quadratic speciﬁcation in
A1. The rest of the proof is straightforward. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose ﬁrst that both ￿ and ￿ are different than 0 and that ￿ is small. A
symmetric equilibrium where both principal share information exists if and only if
V e
I ￿ V e
N;I:
Using a second-order Taylor approximation around the point ￿ = 0 one has
V e
I ￿ ￿ + lim
￿!0
E￿jE￿i(qe (￿ij￿j)



























































Using the outputs characterized in Propositions 3 and 4
V ￿
I ￿ V ￿
N;I ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿2
4(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
2)
; (29)
which shows that when ￿ is small and both ￿ and ￿ are different than 0, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium of the game where both principals share information if ￿￿ < 0.
A symmetric equilibrium where principals do not share information exists if and only if
V e
N ￿ V e
I;N:
Using a second-order Taylor approximation around the point ￿ = 0 one has
V e
N ￿ ￿ + lim
￿!0
E￿(qe (￿)
























































Using the outputs characterized in Propositions 2 and 4
V ￿





implying that when ￿ is small and both ￿ and ￿ are different than 0, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium of the game where both principals do not share information if ￿￿ > 0 .
Finally, it is easy to verify that lim￿!0
￿
V ￿






















4(1 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿)













4(1 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
< 0:
Note also that since the sign of (29) is always opposite to the sign of (31), the equilibria of game G
are in dominant strategies. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that both ￿ and ￿ are different than 0 and that ￿ is small. Taking
the difference between (28) and (30)
V e




























Using the outputs characterized in Propositions 2 and 3, it is easy to show that
V e
I ￿ V e
N ￿
￿￿2
4(1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿)
"
￿2








which immediately shows that V e
I > V e
N for ￿ small enough and different than 0. Suppose now









4(1 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 > 0;
which concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of this result follows immediately from Proposition 6 and Lemma
3. ￿
29Proof of Proposition 7. Agents’ expected rents when there is no communication are equal to
E￿i(Ue(￿i)) = ￿￿￿qe(￿): (32)
When instead both principals share information agents’ expected rents are equal to
E￿iE￿j(Ue(￿ij￿j)) = ￿￿￿E￿j(qe(￿j￿j)j￿): (33)
Taking the difference between (32) and (33):




[E￿j(qe(￿j￿j)j￿) ￿ qe(￿)] = ￿
￿2￿2￿￿2
2(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿)
< 0:
Suppose now that ￿ is different than zero and that ￿ is small, using a ﬁrst-order Taylor approx-
imation
￿￿￿[E￿j(qe(￿j￿j)j￿) ￿ qe(￿)] ￿
￿ ￿
￿￿2
2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2)
"
￿2









which immediately implies the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8. To show the result one needs to verify that the maximal transfer te(￿j￿)
compatible with the Bayesian incentive constraint (11) must satisfy the following properties: (i)
break inequality (19), and (ii) satisfy the agent’s limited liability constraint in state (￿;￿). Devel-
oping (11):
te(￿j￿) = ￿qe(￿j￿) ￿
Pr(￿j￿)
Pr(￿j￿)





^ te(￿j￿) = max
te(￿j￿)
￿
te(￿j￿) : te(￿j￿) ￿ ￿qe(￿j￿) ￿ 0
￿
= ￿qe(￿j￿) + ￿￿
Pr(￿j￿)
Pr(￿j￿)
qe(￿j￿) + ￿￿qe(￿j￿): (35)






which is the contradiction that delivers the result. ￿
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